

**THE MYTHOLOGICAL GENESIS OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC LOGOS:
CONCEPTUAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN COSMOGONIC POETRY
AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY**

[A GÊNESE MITOLÓGICA DO LOGOS PRÉ-SOCRÁTICO: SIMILITUDES
CONCEITUAIS ENTRE POESIA COSMOGÔNICA E FILOSOFIA NATURAL]

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DOI: [10.25244/1984-5561.2024.6930](https://doi.org/10.25244/1984-5561.2024.6930)

Recebido em: 16 de março de 2025. Aprovado em: 7 de maio de 2025

Caicó, ano 17, n. 2, 2024, p. 29-46

ISSN 1984-5561 - DOI: [10.25244/1984-5561.2024.6930](https://doi.org/10.25244/1984-5561.2024.6930)

Fluxo Contínuo



Abstract: In this article we present an analysis and description of the interconnections between Greek poetry and the emergence of pre-Socratic thought, highlighting the conceptual affinities that link mythical imaginary to rational reflection. It is argued that the natural philosophy of the originary thinkers did not emerge in isolation from history, culture and society, but as an innovative interpretation of pre-existing concepts in mythological narratives. Through an analytical-descriptive methodology that combines bibliographical review, hyperfocused reading, comparative studies, hermeneutic proficiency, critical approach and creative writing, this work aims to demonstrate that pre-Socratic rationality did not entirely break with the word of the poets, but was a way of interpreting the world that drew inspiration from the primordial sources of mythology. Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes will be thought of here from connections with the poetics of Homer and Hesiod, in order to reveal how mythical language was transformed into an instrument for understanding nature and the universe. As a result of this philosophical investigation, we intend to elucidate the extent to which the emergence of Logos is intrinsically linked to Mythos, suggesting that the difference between the two categories is not an opposition, but a dialectical continuity.

Keywords: Natural Philosophy. Greek Mythology. Ancient Thought.

Resumo: Neste artigo apresentamos uma análise e descrição das interconexões entre a poesia grega e o surgimento do pensamento pré-socrático, ao destacar as afinidades conceituais que vinculam o imaginário mítico à reflexão racional. Argumenta-se que a filosofia natural dos pensadores originários não emergiu em isolamento da história, da cultura e da sociedade, mas como uma interpretação inovadora de conceitos preexistentes nas narrativas mitológicas. Por meio de uma metodologia analítico-descritiva que combina revisão bibliográfica, leitura hiperfocada, estudos comparativos, proficiência hermenêutica, abordagem crítica e escrita criativa, este trabalho idealiza demonstrar que a racionalidade pré-socrática não rompeu inteiramente com a palavra dos poetas, sendo uma forma de interpretar o mundo que obteve inspiração nas fontes primordiais da mitologia. Tales, Anaximandro e Anaxímenes aqui serão pensados a partir de conexões com a poética de Homero e Hesíodo, no sentido de desvelar como a linguagem mítica foi transformada em instrumento para servir à compreensão da natureza e do universo. Enquanto resultado desta investigação filosófica, nós pretendemos evidenciar em que medida a emergência do Logos está intrinsecamente ligada ao Mythos, ao sugerir que a diferença entre as duas categorias não configura uma oposição, mas uma continuidade dialética.

Palavras-chave: Filosofia Natural. Mitologia Grega. Pensamento Antigo.

INTRODUCTION: *MYTHOS* AND *LOGOS* IN THE ORIGINS OF PHILOSOPHY

The central goal of this article is to present, based on a broad theoretical framework, the continuities between mythical thought and natural philosophy in the context of Archaic Greece (KAHN, 1960; GUTHRIE, 1962). We will endeavour to substantiate and develop the argument that the emergence of the Logos did not represent a radical break with the Mythos, but a manifestation of rationality that re-signified both the themes and the structures of cosmogonic and theogonic narratives (FINLEY, 1981; MURRAY, 1993). By analysing and describing how the central concepts of the pre-Socratics were influenced by the poetry of Homer and Hesiod, we aim to highlight how the first Western thinkers adapted mythical language in order to develop rational explanations of the origin and phenomena of the universe (LUCCHESI, 2019; FREITAS, 2025). In other words, we will mobilise our forces to discuss the dialectical relationship between myth and reason, highlighting that the latter retained traces of the former, even in the search for an analytical understanding of reality.

Jean-Pierre Vernant [1914-2007], in his work *The Origins of Greek Thought*, analyses and describes the transition from the 8th to the 7th century BC in Archaic Greece. According to him, this turning of the key in the world of ideas marks the beginning of the supposed need for a “progressive move away” from the religious mentality and the emergence of rational thought, in other words, the detachment from a belief system based on the mythical worldview, *Mythos*: “in place of the ancient cosmogonies associated with royal rituals and myths of sovereignty, a new thought seeks to establish the order of the world in relations of symmetry, balance and equality between the various elements that make up the cosmos” (VERNANT, 2002, p. 4, our translation). Vernant (2002) emphasises the importance of contextualising this transformation in the Mycenaean scenario, pointing out that Greek society, during the period in question, not only witnessed the approach and influence of Eastern culture, but also began to form the foundations of the City-State regime, to say, the *Polis*.¹ The secularisation of politics in this context is seen as a determining element that paved the way for the advent of philosophy or rational thinking in the West, the *Logos*:

If we want to record the birth of this Greek Reason, follow the path by which it was able to rid itself of a religious mentality, indicate what it owes to myth and how it overcame it, we must compare and contrast with the Mycenaean background this turn from the 8th to the 7th century in which Greece took a new direction and explored the paths that were proper to it: a time of decisive mutation which, at the same moment that the orientalisising style triumphs, lays the foundations of the Polis regime and ensures through this secularisation of political thought the advent of philosophy (VERNANT, 2002, p. 4, our translation).

¹ The *Polis* in Archaic Greece [8th-6th centuries BC] emerged as a distinct form of political and social organisation, characterised by its autonomy, self-sufficiency, and civic institutions, with a collective identity deeply rooted in citizen participation. Unlike the centralised, palatial structure of the Mycenaean *Polis*, as described by scholars such as John Chadwick (1976) in *The Mycenaean World* and Moses Finley (1981) in *The World of Odysseus*, the Archaic *Polis* was marked by a gradual democratisation of power, albeit within a socially stratified framework where the aristocracy played a dominant role in political decision-making. The establishment of institutions such as the *Agora* [public space for debate] and the *Boulé* [community council] reflected a transition from monarchic models to less authoritarian forms of governance, such as oligarchy and, later, others of great importance, such as democracy. The *Polis* also functioned as a religious and cultural space, with civic cults and festivals that reinforced social interaction, as noted by Anthony Snodgrass (1980) in *Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment* and Oswyn Murray (1993) in *Early Greece*. Territorial expansion and the development of alphabetic writing were pivotal factors in consolidating the *Polis* as a fundamental political unit of the Greek world, opening ways for the flourishing of classical civilisation.

The preceding excerpt suggests that the passage from the eighth century to the seventh century was a time of important transformation, during which rationality—which for Vernant (2002) enabled a relationship of equality between the constituent elements of the whole—began to emancipate itself from the domain of religiosity: a phenomenon that allowed a more philosophical perspective on nature and society to flourish. Nevertheless, a critical analysis can be made of the complexity of this transitional phase between *Mythos* and *Logos*.² Werner Jaeger [1888-1961] in *Paideia* and Walter Burkert [1931-2015] in *Greek Religion* understand for themselves that the relationship between myth and reason, at the beginning of Western philosophy, has a much broader character than a simple overcoming of paradigms: the two worldviews, however distinct, were still correlated (FRAZER, 1982; CAMPBELL, 1992). For the latter contemporary expert, the discourse of the first thinkers, to the extent that it recognised its own conceptual limits, embraced the words of the poets in order to be able to base itself: “The self-confidence of theoretical knowledge through the alliance between mathematics and philosophy forged a new god. The impetus of religious language with its superlative formulations helped to overcome the many inconsistencies of argument” (BURKERT, 1993, p. 623, our translation). Burkert (1993) and Jaeger (2008) emphasise that Greek philosophy emerged in an intellectual environment rooted in the mythical tradition, as well as suggesting that the logic of thinking did not necessarily detach itself from religious imagery, but evolved from grade to grade, created its own language and re-signified old notions belonging to mythology in the face of immense cultural diversity (LÜDY, 2005; RASCHE, 2021). In this sense, the purpose of this work is to try to answer the following questions: to what point did the secularisation of political thought effectively separate the religious mentality from rational reflection? Furthermore: in what aspects can the ideas of the pre-Socratic philosophers resonate with the conceptions of origin, composition, order and natural phenomena present in the Cosmogonies and Theogonies? And even more: to what extent are the concepts of *Mythos* and *Logos* distanced or do they go hand in hand, even if in different manners, from their origins to the present?

Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002) marks the apex of the supposed overcoming of the mythical perspective at the beginning of the 6th century BC in the city of Miletus, located in the Ionian archipelago, where thinkers such as Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes began a new paradigm of investigation into nature. The author emphasises the “systematic” and “disinterested” character of the “new approach”, contrasting it with the allegorical thinking found in the Cosmogonies and Theogonies attributed to Homer and Hesiod—Olympian poets of the 8th century BC—considered to be the patrons of Greek culture: “relations of force will be tried to be replaced by relations of a “rational” type, establishing in all domains a regulation based on measure and aimed at providing, “equalising” the various types of exchange that form the fabric of social life” (VERNANT, 2002, p. 63). The first Western philosophers, when addressing questions about the “origin of the world, its composition, order and phenomena”, proposed explanations based on observation and logical reasoning, in apparent opposition to the dramatic imagination of mythological narratives. In this

² The distinction between *Mythos* and *Logos* can be regarded as a fundamental issue for numerous philosophers, such as Edward Craig and Simon Blackburn. From Craig’s (2005) perspective, in *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, the term *Mythos* refers to Cosmogonies and Theogonies—mythological narratives passed down through oral tradition that for centuries formed the cornerstone of education in Greece—while *Logos* pertains to a more rational, systematic approach grounded in empirical evidence and the written word of philosophy as a means of constructing knowledge. According to Blackburn (2008), in *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, the differentiation between the real and the imaginary is indispensable to understanding the emergence of philosophy in Archaic Greece, a setting in which the earliest thinkers sought explanations for natural phenomena rooted in reason—that is, an understanding of the world distinct from what was conveyed in Homeric and Hesiodic myths. In the views of Robert Audi (1999), Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu (2009), the contrast between *Mythos* and *Logos* not only delineates distinct modes of thought but also establishes a significant milestone in the history of ideas, as it signifies both the reality of a vision shaped by imagination and the birth of an unprecedented way of thinking in the Western world.

line of interpretation, Vernant (2002) emphasises the importance of the Ionians in opening up a rational way of understanding the *Kosmos*. This was the beginning of Western philosophy:

It was at the beginning of the sixth century, in Ionian Miletus, that men like Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes inaugurated a new way of thinking about nature, which they took as the object of a systematic and disinterested investigation, a history, of which they presented an overall picture, a *theoria*. Of the origin of the world, its composition, its order, meteorological phenomena, they propose explanations free of all the dramatic imagery of ancient theogonies and cosmogonies (VERNANT, 2002, p. 71, our translation).

It is important to note that Vernant's (2002) description may underestimate the complexity of the historical and intellectual context in which these philosophers from Miletus flourished. Although Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, all from the 6th century BC, did indeed challenge the mythical traditions with their naturalistic theories, it is nonetheless necessary to consider that they themselves were inextricably integrated into the culture, mentality and society of the time (BURKERT, 1993; JAEGER, 2008). Their explanations of nature still reflected a mixture of empirical observations and theological conceptions, such as *Arché*, *Kosmos* and *Nomos*, which does not represent a complete break with the mythical worldview:³ “systematic thought endeavours to identify and understand the “absolute principle” of which the cosmogonies speak, to unravel the mystery of the Creation of the World, in short, the mystery of the appearance of Being” (ELIADE, 1972, p. 81, our translation). Furthermore, the very prospect of a “disinterested enquiry” can also be questioned, since the first thinkers were, to a certain extent, motivated by a desire to understand the world and the phenomena around them. However, the concepts used by the Ionian triad to describe reality were undeniably absorbed from the vocabulary of Homer's Cosmogonies and Hesiod's Theogonies (BURCKHARDT, 2002; LÜDY, 2005). Thus, while the contribution of pre-Socratic rationality to the emergence of philosophy can be seen as indispensable, a critical approach to the cultural diversity that gravitates around this supposed rupture between *Mythos* and *Logos* is still relevant for systematic reflection: beyond the dualistic paradigms that often seem to ignore the concepts of unity, coexistence in difference and multiplicity in the conceptual formation of originary thought.

Therefore, as possible answers to the questions posed above, a series of evidences demonstrating the coexistence of pre-Socratic rationality and mythical thought will be correlated (ELIADE, 1972; BURKERT, 1993). The following perspectives are intended to strengthen the hypothesis according to which philosophy, being distinct from the poetry of Homer and Hesiod, did not flourish outside the history and culture that contextualised social life in Archaic Greece, but came to light in a period strongly marked by the influence of religiosity and mythology on education and popular customs (JAERGER, 2008; RASCHE, 2021). Thus, the results of this research seek to elucidate how natural reason, although distinct from the words of the poets and

³ As articulated by Robert Audi (1999), *Arché* refers to the fundamental principle underlying the composition and functioning of the universe. Within the pre-Socratic tradition, philosophers sought to identify *Arché* as the primordial element from which all things originated. From Thales' Water and Anaximenes' Air to Heraclitus' Fire and Xenophanes' Earth, *Arché* represented the essential substance constituting the diversity of the physical world. *Kosmos*, as elucidated by Edward Craig (2005), denotes the harmony and order inherent in the whole, a concept that extends beyond physical structure to encompass moral and aesthetic planning, serving also as a model to explain the reality and organisation of earthly affairs. *Nomos*, according to Simon Blackburn (2008), pertains to the conventions, laws, and norms that govern societal life. Even within myths, as in philosophy, while *Arché* and *Kosmos* are notions that explain the universal principle and order, respectively, *Nomos* fulfils a similar function: it establishes ordinance within the political and social dimensions of human experience, particularly in the *Polis*.

in the sunrise of thinking in the West, was not dissociated from the activities of life in society, nor was it unable to resort to poetic language when necessary.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MYTHICAL THOUGHT

In this section we will analyse and describe how Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002) understands the myths of sovereignty in the Greek Cosmogonies and Theogonies, highlighting his interpretation that the cosmic, social and ritual order derive from the triumph of the supreme divinities over the agents that spread the original chaos. The criticism levelled at the perspectives presented by Vernant is based on the argument that his tendency reduces mythology to a narrative of domination, which undervalues and neglects the dialectical complexity of mythical thought. Authors such as Mircea Eliade (1954) and Claude Lévi-Strauss (2023)—who establish a counterpoint to the underappreciation of myths of origin—argue that the latter go beyond the linearity of divine victory, since they involve conflicts, ambiguities, cyclicities and syntheses that reflect a profound understanding of reality. In this sense, Roland Barthes (2001) and Jacob Burckhardt (2002) reinforce the idea that mythology constitutes a complex system of meanings, essential to the development of perception and interpretation of the world. In other words, in the following lines we aim to show that pre-Socratic philosophy emerged not as a radical break with mythical imaginary, but as a conceptual evolution that maintained a profound dialogue with traditional narratives, integrating their symbolic richness into the search for a rational conception of the nature.

Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002) emphasises the importance of the “sovereignty myths” present in the Greek Cosmogonies and Theogonies, insofar as they describe not only the “progressive emergence of an ordered world”, but also exalt the power of sovereign deities, reigning over the entire universe. From his perspective, the totality of the cosmic order was “the product of the triumph of a divinity” over the constant antagonisms of natural reality: “at the end of the battles that the god had to sustain against rivals and monsters, his supremacy appears definitively assured, and nothing can now call it into question” (VERNANT, 2002, p. 75, our translation). Vernant (2002) underlines how mythical narratives are limited only to describing the creation of the *Kosmos*, while at the same time interpreting them as restricted to merely emphasising the role of the sovereign god, in other words, the imposition of a supreme order over all domains of life: which includes understanding nature, society and religion as products derived from epic struggles fought on the battlefield of the imaginary. This vision of domination in mythical thought shows a close relationship between the cosmic structure and divine authority, as well as conceiving universal harmony as the exclusive and unique result of the supreme divinities' victory over primordial chaos:

The Greek theogonies and cosmogonies include, like the cosmologies that followed them, accounts of genesis that show the progressive emergence of an ordered world. But they are also, above all, something else: myths of sovereignty. They exalt the power of a god who reigns over the entire universe: they tell of his birth, his struggles, his triumph. In all domains—natural, social, ritual—order is the product of the sovereign god's victory (VERNANT, 2002, p. 75, our translation).

Vernant's (2002) focus on the triumph of the sovereign god can be interpreted as an anthropomorphic projection of the power and authority structures present in the society of the

time. However, a critical reading of this approach, such as that carried out by Mircea Eliade [1907-1986] in *Myth and Reality* and Lévi-Strauss [1908-2009] in *Myth and Meaning*, presents challenges in interpreting the Cosmogonies and Theogonies exclusively as “sovereignty myths”. In this sense, mythological narratives cannot be reduced to “manifestations of power and order”, because they are often linked to disorder and conflict, which contradicts the one-sided view of victory as a precursor to cosmic ordainment: “The mythical solution of conjugation is very similar in structure to the chords that resolve and end the musical piece, because they too offer a conjugation of extremes that come together for one last time” (LEVI-STRAUSS, 2023, p. 73, our translation). Vernant's interpretation (2002) suggests that, rather than representing an explanation based on observable facts for natural phenomena—a task quite distinct from a symbolic narrative that encompasses all the antagonisms, all the contradictions inherent in the world—myths should be seen as ideological reflections of a socio-political structure in Greek culture, where the figure of the sovereign divinity exemplifies and justifies the hierarchies and ambivalences of human actions. As much as Vernant highlights the role of mythical thought in explaining cosmic organisation, he doesn't question the extent to which mythology can reflect a relevant understanding of the realities of nature and the universe.

By stating that in mythical thought one could not imagine an “autonomous domain of nature” or a “law of organisation immanent to the universe”, Vernant (2002) seems to neglect the diversity of interpretations and symbolisms that myths offer to explain the relationship between humanity, natural phenomena and the cosmic order. As he himself puts it: “The establishment of sovereign power and the foundation of order appear as two inseparable aspects of the same divine drama, the trophy of the same struggle, the fruit of the same victory” (VERNANT, 2002, p. 76, our translation). The author's approach not only fails to recognise the cultural importance of mythological narratives, but also suggests that, for Greek society, the natural sphere is empty of theological and poetic meanings, being a simple arrangement that can be grasped by rationality. In this sense, a well-reasoned reading of Greek myths by contemporary thinkers should not disregard their symbolic richness and the deep layers of meaning they offer for understanding the world of life:

As nature and society remain confused, order, in all its forms and in all domains, is placed under the dependence of the Sovereign. Neither in the human group, nor in the universe, is it still conceived abstractly in and of itself. In order to exist, it needs to be established, and in order to last, it needs to be maintained; it always presupposes an ordering agent, a creative force capable of promoting it. Within the framework of this mythical thinking, one could not imagine an autonomous domain of nature or a law of organisation immanent to the universe (VERNANT, 2002, p. 78, our translation).

On one hand, Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002) seems to adopt a stance that overvalues rationality while devaluing mythical narratives: while he claims that in the latter, nature and society remain inseparable, as if the two were separable—a separability that contradicts the existence of an “order immanent to the universe”. On the other hand, Jacob Burkhardt [1818-1897] and Roland Barthes [1915-1980] offer criticisms of this standpoint, since they recognise the symbolic value of mythology and the fundamental role of myth-thinking poets in the socio-cultural structuring of philosophical reflection.⁴ For the last-mentioned author, in his work entitled *Mythologies*,

⁴ Mythology, as a symbolic system, played a pivotal role in the sociocultural structuring of natural philosophy by constructing narratives that articulated the ordering principles of the *Kosmos*, society, and human existence. Mythopoetic thinkers, such as Homer and Hesiod, not only preserved oral traditions but also erected conceptual frameworks that influenced the consolidation of rational reflection. As observed by Walter Burkert (1993) in *Greek Religion*, myths functioned as a symbolic language that encoded ethical values, social norms, and cosmological explanations, thereby

overvaluing the form to the detriment of the meaning of myths implies a systematic impoverishment of the experience of thinking: “As a form of myth, the proposition reveals almost nothing else of this long history. The meaning contained a whole system of values. [...] Form has removed all this richness: its present poverty requires a meaning to fill it” (BARTHES, 2001, p. 139, our translation). The arguments of Barthes (2001) and Burckardt (2002) follow a line in which mythologies should not be seen as “sets of false stories” or “simplifications of life”, but as “complex systems of meaning” that mould the perception and interpretation of the world in terms of valuation. Vernant (2002) proposes a hierarchical and teleological view of mythical thought, in which the cosmic ordainment is understood as “dependent on a sovereign god”, an agent external to the whole and generator of everything. Such a perspective seems to disregard the autonomy of the mythical conception, established in a historical, geographical, political, literary and natural context, like all human knowledge and creations: a hierarchisation that ends up limiting too much the understanding of the dynamics present in the formation of Greek philosophy.

Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002) discusses the role of myth in creating both a “distinction” and a “distancing” between “temporal and power principles”. He argues that myths not only narrate the “chronological origin of the world”, but also describe the “evolution of divine powers” that preside over its current ordering. According to the author, the distance between temporality and sovereignty is fundamental to the constitution of mythical thought: “The problem of genesis, in the strict sense, is therefore, in theogonies, if not entirely implicit, at least in the background. Myth does not ask itself how an ordered world arose from chaos” (VERNANT, 2002, p. 78, our translation). The series of “divine generations”, as presented in the Greek Cosmogonies and Theogonies, serves to detail the attributes of the sovereign avatars until the emergence of a “definitive supremacy” which, in turn, finalises the drama of the process of domination, or *Dynastheia*.⁵ This interpretation of sovereignty emphasises the dynamic and evolutionary nature of mythological narratives, which not only explain origins, but also describe the transformation and consolidation of cosmic forces over time:

The function of myth is to establish a distinction and communicate a distance between what is first from the point of view of time and what is first from the point of view of power; between the principle that is chronologically at the origin of the world and the principle that presides over its present ordering. Myth is constituted in this distance; it makes it the very object of its narrative, describing, through the series of divine generations, the avatars of sovereignty until the moment when a supremacy, this one definitive, puts an end to the dramatic elaboration of the dynasty (VERNANT, 2002, p. 78-79, our translation).

laying the groundwork for subsequent philosophical elaboration. Mircea Eliade (1954), in *The Myth of the Eternal Return*, highlights that mythology provided a model of reality integrating the sacred and the profane, enabling early philosophers to question and reinterpret both reality and the imaginary. Furthermore, as Bruno Snell (1953) notes in *The Discovery of the Mind*, mytho-poetic thinkers were indispensable in introducing a “reflective consciousness” that, through narrating the actions of gods and heroes, opened the pathway for conceptual abstraction and the search for the *Arkhé*. Thus, mythology not only preceded philosophy but also supplied the symbols and narrative structures that enabled the flourishing of an inquiry into the phenomena of nature and humanity’s place within the universe.

⁵ Regarding *Dynastheia*, Audi (1999) and Blackburn (2008) examine it through the lens of the exercise of power or dynastic rule, as undertaken by a lineage or family over time. For Craig (2005), Bunnin and Yu (2009), this concept signifies a framework of conditions that constitute a specific social and political context—namely, the mechanisms of governance or the exertion of authority which, in Archaic Greece, were justified through Cosmogonies and Theogonies. These narratives depicted the actions of the gods as determining the order of society, with the achievements of the deities serving as a mirror to reflect the deeds of the rulers of the Greek city-state.

The overlapping perspective implies conceptual complications in the attempt to clearly categorise the temporal and dominion distinction in the mythological context. Jacob Burckhardt (2002) in *The History of Greek Culture* and Levi-Strauss (2023) in *Myth and Meaning*, for example, argue that categorising myths in terms of chronology and sovereign power may be excessively simplistic: in the works in question, these authors highlight the symbolic relationships and multiplicity of meanings present in mythology and suggest that their approach as a mere “narrative of sovereignty” may neglect many relevant aspects.⁶ For the first of the aforementioned philosophers, these ideas “surpassed knowledge by assuming its primordial form, containing in itself all of nature, the knowledge of the earth and of history, as well as religion and cosmogony in a marvellously symbolic garb” (BURCKHARDT, 2002, p. 335). Therefore, the idea of a “definitive supremacy that puts an end to the dramatic elaboration of domination” can show unnecessary linearity, while mythologies often present ambivalences, cyclicalities and problems that contradict a one-dimensional interpretation. In this way, although Vernant's (2002) reading of the origins of thinking in the West provides a valuable insight as an explanation of the distinction between *Mythos* and *Logos*, it is nonetheless essential to consider the multiple layers of meaning present in the Cosmogonies and Theogonies—in order to understand in a little more depth the emergence of philosophy in Greek society.

THE MYTHICAL LANGUAGE IN NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

In this section we will try to analyse and describe the correspondence between mythical language and the emergence of the philosophy of the physical world. In contrast to what Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002) postulates—for whom the detachment from the mytho-poetic vision constituted the fundamental movement of a rational approach to the origin and structuring of the universe in pre-Socratic thought—we intend to highlight the perspectives that emphasise the continuity between *Mythos* and *Logos* in the context of Archaic Greece, such as those presented by James Frazer (1982) and Joseph Campbell (1992), who consider mythology to be a complex system of meanings that are indispensable for understanding reality. In other words, we intend to conduct a critical analysis of the supposed transition between myth and reason, evidencing both the contributions and limitations of Vernant's standpoint. By integrating the perspectives of authors such as Doods (1951), Rudhardt (1981), Nietzsche (2008), Jaeger (2008), among others, we will bring a more nuanced interpretation of the origins of philosophy in the West, by emphasising the relevance of Cosmogonies and Theogonies as a cultural and intellectual substrate for the development of a natural rationality.

⁶ An approach to mythical thought as a narrative of sovereignty tends to overlook fundamental philosophical aspects that extend beyond the simplistic legitimisation of power. Mary Beard (1992), in *The Invention of the Past: The Uses of Greek Mythology*, and Geoffrey Kirk (1970), in *Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures*, for instance, argue that Greek mythology is not confined to a political or hierarchical function but also operates as a complex system of symbolic meaning that encompasses paradoxes, contradictions, and the pluralistic nature of the human condition. From this perspective, Cosmogonies and Theogonies do not merely justify the established order but also question and subvert norms, as evidenced in the myths of Prometheus and Pandora, which problematise the relationship between humans, gods, and the *Kosmos*. Furthermore, as highlighted by Luc Brisson (1996) in *Introduction à la Philosophie du Mythe*, mythology serves as a repository of ontological and epistemological questions that precede and influence philosophy, such as the origin of the universe, the constitution of time, and the connections between the divine and the mortal. By reducing Homeric and Hesiodic verses to a discourse of domination, one loses sight of their dialectical dimension and their capacity to articulate ethical and metaphysical dilemmas that continue to resonate in contemporary ideas.

Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002) posits that, within the intellectual framework of the earliest Western thinkers, all that exists is nature, with every phenomenon sharing the same vital forces and energies, thereby forming a “coherent and homogeneous system”. This new worldview, which, according to the author, transcends the mytho-poetic language and incorporates the myriad exchanges of the social tissue, immediately and paradoxically excludes “supernatural agents whose adventures, struggles, and achievements constituted the narrative of genesis myths that recounted the emergence of the world and the establishment of order” (VERNANT, 2002, p. 70, our translation). Vernant (2002) regards the central conception of *Physis* as the “unifying principle” that permeates the entire universe in pre-Socratic thought: this includes human beings, the natural sphere, and even deities as integral components of the physical world.⁷ The immanent character of this philosophical shift underscores the interconnectedness and underlying unity amidst the apparent diversity of reality, while simultaneously affirming the human intellect's capacity to “perfectly comprehend” the pathways through which the organization of natural elements emerged and solidified:

Among the Ionian “physicists”, the positive character abruptly encompassed the totality of being. Nothing exists that is not nature, *physis*. Humans, deities, and the world constitute a unified, homogeneous universe, all on the same plane: they are parts or aspects of a single *physis* that mobilises the same forces and manifests the same life force throughout. The pathways through which this *physis* originated, diversified, and organised itself are entirely accessible to human intelligence (VERNANT, 2002, p. 70, our translation).

A hyperfocused reading of the passage above reveals certain conceptual limitations and issues. While the idea of unifying *Physis* may open a pertinent and integrative horizon for understanding the universe, it may also excessively downplay the variety and complexity of both natural and human experience. As suggested by Friedrich Nietzsche [1844-1900] in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* and Werner Jaeger in *Paideia*, the assertion that the pathways through which nature developed are “perfectly” accessible to human understanding can be considered exceptionally reductive. From a nietzschean perspective: “Whenever someone sought to withdraw and erect a barrier of self-sufficiency around themselves, philosophy was ready to isolate them further and destroy them through that very isolation” (NIETZSCHE, 2008, I, p. 5). Comprehending *Physis* as self-caused, with its evolutionary, organisational, and multidimensional processes, demands not only a high level of intelligence but also meticulous observation, rigorous experimentation, verifiable results, critical interpretation of data, among other criteria—and even then, it cannot be deemed perfect. For, as Nietzsche (2008) and Jaeger (2008) observe, both rationality and all that stems from human knowledge carry with them a broad spectrum of imperfections. For this reason, while the conception of a unifying principle of natural forces has its merits in forming a totalising worldview, it remains advantageous to acknowledge the variables and challenges inherent in any rational analysis and description of cosmic phenomena.

⁷ On one hand, Edward Craig (2005) defines *Physis*, or nature, as a central element in the thought of the pre-Socratic thinkers. This concept was not confined solely to the tangible realm but also encompassed the principle from which all things originated, thereby contrasting the mythical view of Greek cosmology and enabling the development of a rational reflection on the origin of the universe. On the other hand, Simon Blackburn (2008) regards *Physis*, or the natural order, as a dynamic force that permeated the world, driving development and transformation: a notion that contrasted with the static and hierarchical conception of reality found in a few mythical narratives, while also introducing the possibility of innovative, critical, and systematic thought about the natural world. Drawing on the definitions provided by Audi (1999), Bunnin and Yu (2009), *Physis* can be understood as a cornerstone in the evolution of ideas, for it was upon this concept that Western philosophy was founded.

In the cosmovision of the Ionian thinkers, as articulated by Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002), the “primordial events” that gave rise to the *Kosmos* are conceived in the “image of observable phenomena” within the daily order, the *Nomos*. The social occurrences unfolding in the everyday life of the *Polis* thus become the keys to understanding origins and nature, as these, from the author’s perspective, can provide models capable of explaining how the world was “constituted and ordered”: “In Ionian lands, logos would have abruptly detached itself from myth, like scales falling from the eyes of the blind. And the light of this reason, once revealed, would never cease to illuminate the progress of the human spirit” (VERNANT, 2002, p. 71, our translation). In the preceding excerpt, Vernant (2002) hints at a significant “reversal” in the approach to mythical thought compared to the emerging Ionian perspective in Archaic Greece. The author argues that, in the Cosmogonies and Theogonies predating pre-Socratic philosophy, “everyday experience” found “meaning and clarity” only through the “exemplary acts” performed “by the gods in the beginning”:

For mythical thought, everyday experience was clarified and acquired meaning in relation to the exemplary acts performed by the gods “at the origin”. The terms of comparison are inverted among the Ionians. The primitive events, the forces that produced the cosmos, are conceived in the image of the facts observed today and depend on an analogous explanation. It is no longer the original that illuminates and transfigures the everyday; rather, it is the everyday that makes the original intelligible, providing models to understand how the world was formed and ordered (VERNANT, 2002, p. 71, our translation).

A critical analysis of the aforementioned contrast reveals a profound divergence in the relationship of correspondence between *Mythos* and *Logos*. While Vernant (2002) emphasises the “paradigmatic shift” whereby the “everyday renders myth intelligible”, taking into account the complexities inherent in this transformation is crucial to understanding the birth of Greek philosophy. Consequently, as suggested by James Frazer [1854-1951] in *The Golden Bough* and Joseph Campbell [1904-1987] in *The Masks of God*, the hierarchical distancing between mythical and logical perspectives—as if one excluded or surpassed the other—may lead to the loss of the sacredness, theological significance, and the inseparable social, cultural, and sapiential value of “origin myths”. In other words: “Not that everything the poets said about it was true in every detail, but the basic idea must be taken very seriously. Myth, logos, and nomos thus form an alliance” (BURKERT, 1997, p. 627, our translation). The emphasis on rationalising the world through ordinary models, as proposed by Vernant (2002), may suggest an excessive reduction of the symbolic richness of mythological narratives. Understanding the extraordinary through the lens of the everyday can, at times, as conceived by Frazer (1982) and Campbell (1992), hinder the overcoming of the boundaries of ordinary experience and lead to a categorically reductive interpretation of the universe. Thus, while the paradigm shift presented in Vernant’s (2002) work conceals a contentious aspect of the evolution of Western thought, it also raises doubts about the philosophical and cultural implications of this “transitional phase” in the understanding of the whole, as well as provoking a series of questions about the natural significance of mythology for the originary thinkers.

Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002) underscores the profound “intellectual rupture” initiated by the “Milesians”, that is, the thinkers of Miletus, particularly in their approach to the origin and order of the universe as problems to be resolved through reason, rather than as matters belonging to the realm of mystery and religion. In the words of the author: “The philosopher is not content to repeat in terms of physis what the theologian had expressed in terms of divine Power. The shift in register, the use of a secular vocabulary, corresponds to a new attitude of mind” (VERNANT,

2002, p. 73, our translation). Vernant (2002) observes that the pre-Socratic philosophers, in their dedication to investigating nature, assumed a role of knowledge “detached from the ritual and religious concerns” that characterised mythical thought. The paradigm shift defended by the author represented a significant step towards the “dissociation of philosophy” from myths of sovereignty, thereby creating space to contemplate a “overcoming” of narratives that depicted the “triumph of the gods” as the initial stage of natural order—an event that marked the advent of a new interpretation of reality:

With the Milesians, for the first time, the origin and order of the world take the form of an explicitly posed problem to which an answer must be given without mystery, at the level of human intelligence, before the assembly of citizens, like other questions of daily life. Thus, a function of knowledge is affirmed, free from all ritual concerns. The “physicists” deliberately ignore the world of religion. Their research no longer has anything to do with those processes of worship to which myth, despite its relative autonomy, always remained more or less tied (VERNANT, 2002, p. 73-74, our translation).

A careful reading of the aforementioned excerpt immediately reveals issues concerning the radical demarcation between philosophical ideas and the religious sphere. Although the Ionians indeed introduced a more rational and distinct approach to interpreting the world, it remains valid to acknowledge that a complete detachment from mythical concerns may present an oversimplified portrait of the interplay between the real and the imaginary in Archaic Greece.⁸ Certain interpretations, such as those offered by Héctor Lüdy in *The Rationality of Mythical Discourse* and Michael Rasche in *The Mythical Foundation of Logos*, suggest that, despite the apparent separation between mythology and rationality, the cosmological and theological questions raised by the pre-Socratics remained connected to the vocabulary of religion.⁹ Expressed differently: “On the one hand, the Greek philosophical genius accepted the essence of mythical thought—the eternal return of things, the cyclical vision of cosmic and human life [...] On the other hand, the Greek spirit did not believe that History could become an object of knowledge” (ELIADE, 1972, p. 82, our

⁸ The complete distancing from mythical paradigms represents an excessive simplification of the relationship between the real and the imaginary in the context of Archaic Greece, as it overlooks the profound interconnection between myth and reason that characterised pre-Socratic philosophy. As Eric Dodds (1951) argues in *The Greeks and the Irrational*, myth was not merely a collection of fantastical tales but a mode of understanding the world that articulated fundamental human experiences, such as fear, hope, love, life, death, and the search for meaning. Mythology provided a symbolic framework that enabled the interpretation of reality and existence, serving as a foundation for subsequent philosophical reflection. Furthermore, as highlighted by Jean Rudhardt (1981) in *Du Mythe, de la Religion Grecque et de la Compréhension d'Autrui*, the categories of *Mythos* and *Logos* were not mutually exclusive but coexisted in a continuous dialogue, where poetic elements were reinterpreted and integrated into rational thought. In this sense, the rationality of the pre-Socratics, while seeking natural explanations for phenomena, maintained an intrinsic connection with the themes and narrative structures of mythology, such as the idea of an ordering principle that echoes traditional Cosmogonies and Theogonies. Therefore, to reduce the birth of philosophy to a radical break with myth is to turn a blind eye to the complexity of a culture that saw in the imaginary a wellspring of wisdom and a bridge to the comprehension of reality.

⁹ The presence of cosmological and theological vocabulary in the questions posed by the pre-Socratics is undeniable, revealing a conceptual continuity between mythical narratives and philosophical reflection. As observed by William Guthrie (1962) in *A History of Greek Philosophy*, the thinkers of Archaic Greece, while seeking rational explanations for physical phenomena, maintained a profound connection with the themes of mythical tradition. For instance, the notion of *Arché*, central to the Milesians, directly echoes the Cosmogonies that describe the emergence of the whole from a structuring principle. Furthermore, as highlighted by Charles Kahn (1960) in *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, the language used by the Ionian philosophers to describe natural processes, such as the coexistence of opposites and cosmic justice or *Dike*, reflects the terminology found in Theogonies, where gods personify natural, moral, and ethical forces. Thus, far from completely breaking away with religiosity and the imaginary, the pre-Socratics reinterpreted mythological conceptions, integrating them into a rational method of inquiry that preserved traces of their sacred origins.

translation). In the sense proposed by Lüdy (2005) and Rasche (2021), the very definition of knowledge as disconnected from ritual order, as conceived by Vernant (2002), becomes contestable: since the process of philosophical inquiry may have been influenced by cultural traditions and conceptual assumptions that were not entirely separate from the ritualistic domain or from natural history. From this perspective, while the distinction between *Mythos* and *Logos* proposed by Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002) holds notable importance for understanding the evolution of Western thought, recognising the ambivalences of this relationship—as well as the need to avoid imposing a mechanically simplified dichotomy between the realms of fable and reason—continues indispensable to a historical comprehension of the birth, development, and contemporary relevance of philosophy.

CONCLUSION: THE MYTHOLOGICAL GENESIS OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC LOGOS

A critical analysis of the texts selected to underpin this study reveals a complex interplay—far more than a mere rupture—between myth and reason in the context of the origins of Greek thought. As is also well-known, the issues formulated by the Ionian physicists were not opposed to religion or mythology *per se*, but rather diverged from the education propagated by the poets who shaped Mycenaean culture and society: “The polemics against Homer and Hesiod were far more significant than those against traditional religion, for these poets were the foundational premise of all Greek life and culture” (BURCKHARDT, 2002, p. 348). Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002) suggests a transposition of religious mentality by rational thought, while also highlighting the emergence of philosophy through a distancing from mythical paradigms. In contrast, Mircea Eliade (1972) emphasises a correlation of forces between *Mythos* and *Logos*, offering a more nuanced perspective on the formation of archaic rationality. In his words:

Greek physics and metaphysics develop certain constitutive themes of mythical thought: the importance of origin, of the *arché*; the essence that precedes human existence; the decisive role of memory, and so on. This does not mean, of course, that there is no discontinuity between Greek myth and philosophy. But it is perfectly understandable that philosophical thought could utilise and extend the mythical vision of cosmic reality and human existence (ELIADE, 1972, p. 82. our translation).

Eliade’s (1972) citation demonstrates that there was no clean break between myth and reason at the dawn of Western philosophy. From his standpoint, what exists are two distinct ways of interpreting reality, which nevertheless coexist within the historical and cultural context of Archaic Greece. Along this same interpretive path, which acknowledges coexistence amidst difference between *Mythos* and *Logos*, follow authors such as Walter Burkert (1993) and Werner Jaeger (2008). According to the first, within a line of reflection rooted in rationality yet not entirely detached from mythology: “The order, which reality seemed to begin to call into question, is to be restored through a comprehensive intellectual project. The form of myth, the narrative about the past, is also assimilated by tradition with naturalness, to be used in describing the genesis of the world” (BURKERT, 1993, p. 583, our translation). Vernant (2002) underscores the significance of the Ionians in opening a more rational path to understanding the *Kosmos*, while also emphasising the systematisation and disinterested nature of the philosophical approach in contrast to mythical narrative. However, in doing so, his perspective ultimately diminishes the complexity of the

historical and intellectual context in which pre-Socratic reason flourished: for it not only overlooks the early thinkers' genuine interest in comprehending the world but also disregards the fragmentary nature of original thought and neglects the enduring influence of mythical narratives in shaping the fundamental horizons of philosophical idearity.

The role of myth in establishing a distinction between temporal and power principles is highlighted by Vernant (2002), who posits that everyday life renders myth intelligible, rather than the reverse, as was the case prior to the Ionians under the influence of Homeric and Hesiodic poetry. As observed by Joseph Campbell (1992) and Walter Burkert (1993), the thought of the philosophers, insofar as it continues to seek the principle of all things—an *Arché* for the *Kosmos* or a *Nomos* for the *Polis*—remains aimed at understanding what was once framed within Cosmogonies and Theogonies, which privileged the problem of the origin of the universe and social order. Thus, it is indeed challenging to identify a real, even if gradual, rupture between mythical and rational thought: “it is difficult to conceive of a radical surpassing of mythical thought while the prestige of 'origins' remains intact and while the forgetting of what happened *in illo tempore*—or in a transcendental world—is considered the principal obstacle to knowledge” (ELIADE, 1972, p. 81, our translation). However legitimate the birth of a new way of thinking about reality in Archaic Greece may be—now grounded in observable everyday phenomena and rationalised by human understanding—the perspective that reduces Homeric and Hesiodic verses to discourses of formality and sovereignty, for Eliade (1972) and Lévi-Strauss (2023), also limits the comprehension of the symbolic breadth and sapiential significance of mythological narratives. Expressed differently, an exclusive critique of the form of myths ultimately impoverishes the meaning inherent in their content:

But the crucial point in all this is that form does not suppress meaning; it merely impoverishes it, distances it, while keeping it at its disposal. We believe that meaning is dying, but it is a suspended death: meaning loses its value but retains its life, which will nourish the form of the myth. Meaning becomes for form like an instant reserve of history, a submissive wealth that can be drawn near or pushed away in a kind of rapid alternation: it is necessary that at every moment form can find roots in meaning and draw nourishment from it; and, above all, it is necessary that form can hide within it. It is this intriguing game of hide-and-seek between meaning and form that defines myth (BARTHES, 2001, p. 140, our translation).

From the perspective presented by Barthes (2001), mythical thought should not be reduced to a mere explanation of power and order but rather considered as a complex system of signification that delineates the intelligibility and perception of the world in terms of value. Regarding the multifaceted and polysemic nature of mythical narratives, Vernant (2002) appears to understand myths solely from the standpoint of the victory of the sovereign god, as if this supremacy constituted the central element in the creation of the *Kosmos* and the establishment of social order or *Nomos*. In contrast, Rasche (2021) and Lévi-Strauss (2023) also consider the defeat of the gods as a process as necessary as their triumph in the organisation of reality. For the latter: “the solution or climax of this conflict arises from the conjunction of the two principles that had opposed each other throughout the myth. It may be a conflict between the powers above and the powers below, the sky and the earth, or the sun and the subterranean powers, and so on” (LÉVI-STRAUSS, 2023, p. 73, our translation). In other words, however endowed with suprahuman powers the deities of mythology may have been, they were subject to downfall in the face of the titanic forces of their equally divine antagonists: yet even destruction could serve as a pretext for the emergence of something new, even a new divine being. Concerning natural reason, Vernant (2002) sustains a paradigm shift regarding primordial events, which cease to be conceived in the

light of Cosmogonies and Theogonies from the 8th century BC and instead are understood based on a presumed perfection of the intellect, arising from a disinterested observation of everyday phenomena beginning in the 6th century BC. The supposed surpassing of mythology by rationality, as proposed by Vernant (2002), underscores the dissociation of philosophy from the sovereignty of the ancient gods, raising pertinent issues and decisive questions about the limits of human intelligence in understanding the totality of nature.

In the endeavour to comprehend *Physis* through *Logos*, as observed by Rodolfo Mondolfo [1877-1976] in *Ancient Thought*, the pre-Socratic thinkers of Ionia were confronted with a three-dimensional problem: namely, identifying the generative substance of all things, which remains in constant flux while simultaneously unifying multiplicity. In the words of the thinker: “This triple demand was already met, in religious thought and in the Theogonies predating the emergence of philosophy, by the conception of the divine principle (*to theíon*), which contained within itself and generated from *per se* the entire universe” (MONDOLFO, 1976, p. 35, our translation). Attempting to understand the extraordinary through the ordinary, as Vernant (2002) suggests, not only diminishes the monumental nature of philosophical ideas by situating them among the mundane but may also imply a denial of the exceptionality of thought: as if conceiving being from non-being or the growth of an ornamental plant without proper botanical care were consistent with the principle of non-contradiction in aristotelian analytics. To overvalue a newly fabricated reasoning, still in the process of establishing its first concepts, at the expense of a tradition previously constituted with solidity, is to divert attention from the ideas absorbed since mythical thought by philosophy itself in its nascent phase:

Thus, the favoured objects of these explanations begin with the “things in the heavens”, *metéora*, the “things beneath the earth”, and the “beginning”, *arché*, from which everything became what it is. The fact that the world must be conceived as a unity originating from a “beginning”, that there exists a ‘becoming,’ *physis*—translated into Latin as *natura*—with its own laws that humans cannot influence, and that the existing world is, ultimately, ‘order,’ *kósmos*, are all postulates assimilated from tradition without reflection but which are to be explained through new concepts (BURKERT, 1993, p. 583, our translation).

A critical reading of the *Mythos-Logos* dichotomy by Walter Burkert (1993) reveals that the relationship between the two terms is far more encompassing than a mere paradigmatic surpassing. Greek philosophy, as can be observed from perspectives beyond Vernant (2002)—such as those of Jaeger (2008) and Rasche (2021)—flourished in an environment that could not suppress mythological narratives, and the logical reasoning of the earliest thinkers was not entirely detached from religious thought but developed in parallel and gradually alongside the wisdom traditions that preceded it. In related terms: “With all its independence from the bonds of traditional religion, philosophy first introduced monotheism, not atheism, and ultimately converged with religion in Neoplatonism” (BURCKHARDT, 2002, p. 348). In alignment with the ideas of Mircea Eliade (1972) and Héctor Lüdy (2005), the icons of ancient thought developed an innovative approach to understanding nature, humanity, and society, yet they did not thereby erase the influences of their mythical predecessors: for the fundamental concepts of the pre-Socratics, such as *Arché*, *Kosmos*, and *Nomos*, were already present in the Cosmogonies and Theogonies of Homer and Hesiod. From this standpoint, in contrast to that conceived by Jean-Pierre Vernant (2002), to understand rationality as superior to mythology or to suggest a rupture between the two is to assume that the philosophers, though distinct from poets and theologians, existed in a world divorced from the history, culture, and religiosity that were integral to the landscape of Archaic Greece.

The unilateral interpretation of myth as an empty form devoid of symbolic content, as proposed by Vernant (2002), undoubtedly risks significantly undervaluing the narratives in question: for in such an approach, the multiplicity of meanings inherent in mythology is cast aside in favour of a rationality stripped of imagination, as though the discourse of the earliest thinkers were not grounded in an intuition of a unifying principle common to all of nature (BARTHES, 2001; BURCKHARDT, 2002). In Classical Greece, following the historical period of the pre-Socratics, in the absence of a rational explanation for natural phenomena, Plato [428/427-348/347 BC], in his philosophical dialogues, turned to Cosmogonies and Theogonies as a source of reference for reason (CAMPBELL, 1992; ONFRAY, 2008). This is why the *Republic* features the myth of the cave, which describes the journey towards knowledge; the narrative of Atlantis in the *Timaean*, which explains the decline of societies as a consequence of political corruption; and Eros in the *Symposium*, which represents the driving force behind the pursuit of truth and beauty, among others (FRAZER, 1982; REALE, 2011). Even Friedrich Nietzsche, in modernity, in *The Birth of Tragedy*, returns to the study of ecstatic and dreamlike states, describing them through the myths of Apollo and Dionysus: the cosmic forces that, for him, when acting together, give life to the supreme form of art (FINK, 2003; FREITAS, 2021). In this sense, concerning the origins of Western philosophy, based on the evidence previously outlined and what it suggests to posterity, it is clear that there may never have been a complete surpassing, let alone a radical separation, between the concepts of *Mythos* and *Logos* (LUCCHESI, 2019; RASCHE, 2021). However distinct these two ways of interpreting the world may be, their uniqueness does not establish a hierarchy in which rationality supersedes the imaginary or vice versa. Broadly speaking, it seems reasonable to conclude, from the assessment conducted here, that while the particularities of mythical narratives and philosophical ideas are acknowledged, they continue to coexist horizontally within the differences that define them, as well as within the pluralistic constitution of the universe of reflection.

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